DOES THE ICJ’S DECISION IN AVENA MEAN ANYTHING TO MEXICANS ON
DEATH ROW?
I.

INTRODUCTION
Texas officials are diligent in their pursuit of death sentences and in their efforts

to carry them out. Prosecutors, for instance, have engaged in blatant misconduct by
withholding important evidence from defendants.1 They have used racially
discriminatory tactics to keep African-Americans off juries.2 Law enforcement officers
have coerced confessions out of defendants and have engaged in other types of
misconduct.3 Furthermore, the state has shown a willingness to execute even those
defendants whose culpability may have been diminished by their age or mental
infirmities. For instance, Texas led the nation in executing juveniles until the Supreme
Court banned this practice4 and the State has executed defendants with serious mental
impairments.5 Prosecutors have argued that a defendant was retarded in order to secure a
death sentence and then, after the Supreme Court prohibited the execution of mentally
retarded individuals, argued on appeal that this same defendant was not retarded.6
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See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2003).
See Miller-El v. Dretke, 73 U.S.L.W. 4479 (2005).
3
See Guidry v. Dretke, 397 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2005); Kenneth Williams, Texas: Tough on Murderers or on
Fairness? 53 Drake L. Rev. 631, 635-643 (2005).
4
According to the Death Penalty Information Center, Texas executed 13 juvenile offenders between 1976
and January 1, 2005. No other state executed more than 3 juvenile offenders during this period.
Information on juvenile executions available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=27&did=882.
5
Kelsey Patterson consistently expressed the delusions that he killed the victims only because devices
implanted in his body by conspirators made him do it, and that he has received a permanent stay of
execution based upon his innocence. He believed that the state of Texas was his only friend. In addition, a
psychologist found that Patterson suffered from bizarre delusions that impaired his rational understanding
of his conviction and pending execution and that there was no credible evidence that he was malingering
his delusions or their effect on his functioning. See Patterson v. Dretke, 370 F.3d 480, 481483 (5th Cir.
2004). As a result of Patterson’s mental illness, the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles recommended to
the Governor that his sentence be reduced to life imprisonment. The Governor, however, refused to follow
the Board’s recommendation and Patterson was subsequently executed.. See Gov. Rick Perry Denies
Commutation, Stay for Kelsey Patterson, available at
http://www.governor.state.tx.us/divisions/press/pressreleases/PressRelease.2004-05-18.3521.
6
See Dean of Death Row, Austin American-Statesman, November 24, 2003.
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Now that the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has decided that the state
violated the rights of Mexican nationals7 on its death row by not informing them of their
rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the President has ordered
state officials to comply with this decision,8 Texas officials have challenged the
President’s authority to issue such an order.9 This article will begin with background
information on the Vienna Convention and the dispute between the U.S. and foreign
governments over the failure of the U.S. to comply with the treaty’s consular notification
provisions. Because Texas officials have challenged the President’s authority to order
them to comply with the ICJ’s decision, there will be an analysis of the legality of the
President’s order. Next, there will be a discussion as to how the litigation is likely to
proceed in state and federal court and a proposal as to how the inmates’ consular
notification claims ought to be resolved. Finally, the article will conclude with a
discussion of why it is important to the U.S. that the ICJ decision is fully complied with
and that there be a credible review of the inmates’ cases.
II. VIENNA CONVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

7

Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. No. 128 (Judgment of
Mar. 31).
8
George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005) (on file with author).
9
During the oral arguments in Medellin v. Dretke, the assistant attorney general arguing for the state of
Texas stated:
We would respectfully submit, as would any responsible state attorney general, that there are
significant constitutional problems with a unilateral Executive determination displacing generally
applicable criminal laws.
See Medellin v. Dretke, 2005 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 25 (March 28, 2005). In response to the President’s
order, the Texas Attorney General stated “the state of Texas believes no international court supersedes the
laws of Texas or the laws of the United States. “ Tolson and Ruiz, Mexicans on Death Row May Get New
Hearings, Houston Chronicle, March 9, 2005 at A1.
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The United States Senate ratified the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in
1969.10 Currently, 167 nations are party to the Convention.11 Article 36 of the
Convention is most pertinent to this discussion.12 Article 36 is designed to “facilitat[e]
the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending state.”13 It provides
that “consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State
and to have access to them.”14 Article 36 further provides that “[i]f he so requests, the
competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post
of the sending State, if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.”15
Furthermore, [a]ny communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested,
in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without
delay.”16 State authorities are required to “inform the person concerned without delay of
his rights under [Article 36].”17
Under Article 36, consular officers “have the right to visit a national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody, or detention, to converse and correspond with
him and to arrange for his legal representation.”18 According to Article 36 rights
contained therein “shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulation of the
receiving State.”19 This requirement, however, is subject to the proviso “that the said
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Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter “Vienna Convention”].
See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General United Nations, N.Y., available at
http://untreaty.un.org.
12
21 U.S.T. 100-101, 596 U.N.T.S. 292-293.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the
rights accorded under this Article are intended.”20
Until recently, the United States was also a party to the Optional Protocol to the
Vienna Convention that mandates “disputes arising out of the interpretation or
application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice.”21 Any party to the Optional Protocol may bring such
disputes before the ICJ.22
Under the U.S. Constitution, treaties are “the supreme Law of the Land.”23 As
such, they are enforceable in court as long as they are self-executing24 and federal courts
have subject matter jurisdiction over any cases and controversies arising under them.25
Although treaties cannot violate the U.S. Constitution,26 they are equivalent to a statute
enacted by Congress and are binding on the states.27 Thus, the Vienna Convention and
the Optional Protocol are the law of the land.
III. U.S. LITIGATION
20

Id.
Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes Art. I, 21 U.S.T. 326, 596
U.N.T.S. 488 [hereinafter “Optional Protocol”]. On March 7, 2005, the United States announced that it
will no longer be a party to the Optional Protocol:

21

This letter constitutes notification by the United States of America that it hereby withdraws from
the [Consular Convention’s Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes]. As a consequence of this withdrawal, the United States will no longer recognize the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice reflected in that Protocol.
See Frederic L. Kirgis, Addendum to ASIL Insight, President Bush’s Determination Regarding Mexican
Nationals and Consular Convention Rights, March 2005, available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/03/insights050309a.html.
22
Id. The United States was the first state party to invoke the optional protocol in the Tehran Hostages
Case. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
23
See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
24
The State Department has regarded the Vienna Convention as self-executing since its ratification. See S.
Exec. Rep. No. 91-9, app. At 2, 5 (1969) (statement of J. Edward Lyerly, Deputy Legal Adviser to the
Department of State).
25
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
26
See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
27
See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
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Although the Vienna Convention is the law of the land, non-compliance with the
Article 36 notification requirements has been a persistent problem. This problem will
only intensify as the number of non-citizens in U.S. prisons increase.28 Voluminous
litigation has resulted from state officials’ failure to provide foreign nationals with the
notification required by Article 36.29 In most instances, state officials do not deny that
they failed to provide notification. Jose Medellin’s experience is fairly typical. After he
was apprehended by Houston officials for the murder of two Texas teenagers, Medellin
told the arresting officers in Texas that he was born in Laredo, Mexico.30 He also told the
booking authorities that he was not a U.S. citizen.31 Medellin, however, was arrested,
detained, tried, convicted, and sentenced to death without ever being informed that he
could contact the Mexican consul.32 Rather, most of the litigation has centered on four
issues: 1) whether the Convention creates individually enforceable rights; 2) whether the
non-citizen must object at trial to preserve the issue for appeal; 3) whether the foreign
national must prove prejudice; and 4) the appropriate remedy for an Article 36 violation.
Although the Supreme Court has left the issue of individual enforceability of the
Vienna Convention open,33 many lower courts have not. There is a presumption that
international treaties do not create rights that are privately enforceable in court.34 The
Supreme Court explained the rationale for this presumption as follows:

28

In 2003, for instance, over 56,000 foreign nationals were held in U.S. prisons and as of February 2005,
119 noncitizens from 31 nations were on state death row. See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. ____ (2005).
29
See United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377 391 (6th cir. 2001) (discussing cases about Vienna
Convention violations).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
See Breard v. Greene 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998).
34
See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 907, cmt. a (1987)
(“International agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private
rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts . . .”).
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A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It depends for the
enforcement of its provisions on the interest and honor of the governments which
are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international
negotiations and reclamation, so far as the injured parties choose to seek redress,
which may in the end be enforced by actual war. It is obvious that with all this
the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give not redress.35
The courts are also reluctant to allow individual enforcement of treaties for fear of
interfering in the nation’s foreign affairs.36 The Supreme Court has, however, recognized
that a treaty can create individually enforceable rights in some circumstances.37 Lower
courts have based their conclusion that the Vienna Convention is not judicially
enforceable primarily on the language in its Preamble: “The purpose of such privileges
and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of
functions by consular posts on behalf of their respective States.”38 In addition, courts
have given deference to the view of the State Department that the Convention is not
judicially enforceable but rather, that the remedies for violations of the convention are
diplomatic, political, or exist between states under international law.39
There is also a general rule requiring that criminal defendants raise objections at
trial before an appellate court will consider any assertions of error.40 Many defendants,
including Jose Medellin, did not object to the Article 36 violation until after they were
convicted.41 As a result of the defendants’ failure to object, appellate courts have often
applied the procedural default doctrine and have refused to consider the merits of the
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Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1984).
See U.S. v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 394 (6th Cir. 2001) (“A contrary conclusion risks aggrandizing
the power of the judiciary and interfering in the nation’s foreign affairs, the conduct of which the
Constitution reserves for the political branches.”).
37
See, e.g., U.S. v. Alvarez –Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667-68 (1992).
38
Id. at 392, quoting preamble of Vienna Convention, 21 U.S.T. at 79, 596 U.N.T.S. at 262 (emphasis
added).
39
See Emuegbunam, supra note 35 at 392.
40
See, e.g., U.S. v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993).
41
See Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 279-80 (5th Cir. 2004).
36
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inmates’ Vienna Convention claim.42 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has intimated43 and numerous courts have held - that a defendant must show prejudice to establish a
violation of the Convention.44 Courts have also disagreed with the inmates that the
remedy for a Vienna Convention violation should be the dismissal of an indictment45 or
the exclusion of evidence obtained from the defendant.46 Finally, civil suits seeking to
enforce the Convention have also been unsuccessful.47
IV.

ICJ LITIGATION
Unable to obtain a satisfactory resolution in U.S. courts, a few nations exercised

their option under the Optional Protocol to seek redress in the ICJ.48 The ICJ rendered
two significant decisions regarding the United State’s obligations under the Vienna
Convention:
1. Paraguay v. U.S.
Angel Francisco Breard was under suspicion for murder and attempted rape.49
During a search of Breard’s apartment, the Arlington, Virginia police found his
Paraguayan passport and as a result were aware that he was a Paraguayan national.50 The
Arlington police, however, did not inform Breard that he was entitled to contact the
Paraguayan consulate nor did they notify Paraguayan consulate officials of Breard’s

42

Id.
See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998).
44
See, e.g., U.S. v. Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2001).
45
See U.S. v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 2002).
46
See U.S. v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 2000).
47
See Breard, supra note 43; Federal Republic of Germany v. U.S., 526 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1999).
48
Paraguay, Germany and Mexico sued the United States in the World Court. Paraguay withdrew its case
after its national was executed. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(Paraguay v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Discontinuance Order of Nov. 10). Decisions were rendered on behalf
of both Germany and Mexico in the other two cases, discussed infra.
49
Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States of America),
(Memorial of the Republic of Paraguay, 9 October 1998), para. 2.1.
50
Id.
43
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arrest.51 After he was indicted, Virginia officials offered Breard a life sentence if he
would agree to plead guilty.52 Because Paraguay does not permit plea bargaining and in
fact makes such deals null and void, Breard rejected the offer.53 He decided instead to
testify and to confess his crime to the jury.54 In Paraguay, the principal means to obtain
leniency would be to confess and denounce the criminal acts charged and appeal to the
mercy of the court.55 The jury convicted Breard and sentenced him to death.56
Approximately three years later, Paraguayan officials learned of Breard’s
imprisonment and pending execution.57 They informed Breard of his rights to consular
notification under the Vienna Convention and explained to him the differences between
the U.S. and Paraguayan legal systems.58 By this time Breard was well into the appellate
process.59 He raised for the first time, in his federal habeas petition, a claim based upon
the failure of Virginia officials to notify him of his rights to consular access.60 The
federal courts held that because the claim had not been raised in state court, it was
procedurally defaulted.61
Paraguay sought to prevent his execution, both in U.S. courts62 and in the ICJ.
They were successful in convincing the ICJ to issue an order that the U.S. “take all
measures at is disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the

51

Id. at para. 2.1-2.2.
Id. at para. 2.3.
53
Id. at para. 2.6-2.7.
54
Id. at para. 2.8.
55
Id. at para. 2.6.
56
Id. at para. 2.2.8-2.10.
57
Id. at para. 2.16.
58
Id. at para 2.17.
59
Id. at para. 2.16.
60
Id. at para. 2.19.
61
Id. at para. 2.19.
62
See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
52
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final decision in these proceedings . . .”63 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court’s application of the procedural default doctrine and held that the ICJ’s order was
not legally binding.64 The Supreme Court suggested that the only means of recourse for
Breard was a reprieve from the Governor of Virginia.65 The Secretary of State wrote to
the Governor of Virginia advising him that the ICJ’s order was non-binding but she
requested a delay of Breard’s execution.66 The Governor refused to do so and Breard was
executed. Paraguay subsequently withdrew is complaint from the ICJ as a result.
2. Germany v. U.S.67
Walter and Karl LaGrand were German nationals who lived most of their lives in
the United States.68 They were both convicted and sentenced to death for their roles in an
Arizona bank robbery.69 Arizona authorities conceded that the LaGrands were convicted
and sentenced to death without receiving the consular notification required by Article 36
and that the German consulate had not been notified of their arrests.70 Arizona
authorities further conceded that no notification was given even after its officials became
aware that the LaGrands were German nationals and not U.S. citizens.71 Neither
LaGrand brother objected to the Vienna Convention violation until their cases were on
appeal and thus the US. Courts applied the procedural default doctrine and refused to

63

Supra note 49 at para. 2.32.
Breard supra note 62.
65
The Court wrote: “If the Governor [of Virginia] wishes to wait for the decision of the ICJ, that is his
prerogative. But nothing in our existing case law allows us to make that choice for him.” Breard v.
Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378 (1998).
66
Supra note 49 at para. 2.41.
67
LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27) (hereinafter “LaGrand”).
68
Id. at 475.
69
Id. at 475.
70
Id. at 475-76.
71
Id. at 475.
64
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consider the merits of their claims.72 Both LaGrand brothers were subsequently executed
despite diplomatic interventions by the German government and despite a provisional
order from the ICJ that Walter LaGrand not be executed pending the disposition of the
ICJ proceedings.73
Germany complained that as a result of the Vienna Convention violations, it was
deprived of the opportunity to provide assistance to its nationals.74 Even though both
LaGrand brothers were executed during the proceedings, Germany, unlike Paraguay,
sought redress for the violations. Specifically, it sought to prevent the U.S from raising
the procedural default doctrine in the future with respect to Vienna Convention violations
and an assurance from the U.S. that it would not repeat its actions in the future.75 The
main contention of the U.S. was that rights of consular notification and access under the
Vienna Convention are rights of States and not of individuals even though individuals
may benefit from these rights.76
The ICJ held that “it would be incumbent upon the United States to allow the
review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the
violation of the rights set forth in the Convention.”77 In addition, the court rejected the
U.S. claim that the Convention does not confer individual rights.78
2. Mexico v. U.S.
Mexico has long sought to provide consular assistance to its nationals residing in
the United States. In 1942, Mexico and the U.S. entered into a bilateral consular
72

Id. at 477-78.
Id. at 473.
74
Id. at 473-74.
75
Id. at 473.
76
Id. at 493-94.
77
Id. at 514.
78
Id. at 494.
73

10

agreement as a result of the “frequent inter-state travel of their respective citizens.”79 In
1965, Mexico ratified the Vienna Convention in order to supplement its bilateral
agreements. In 1986, Mexico developed the Program of Legal Consultation and Defense
for Mexicans Abroad in order to improve the work of its consular officials in representing
the interests of Mexican nationals.80 In 2000, Mexico established the Mexican Capital
Legal Assistance Program in the U.S. in order to provide legal assistance to its nationals
charged with capital offenses.81 Despite these efforts, Mexico’s efforts to assist its
nationals and to ensure compliance with the Vienna Convention have met with limited
success. As a result, Mexico sought the assistance of the ICJ.82
In 2003, Mexico commenced proceedings against the United States on behalf of
54 of its nationals sentenced to death in the U.S.83 Mexico complained that these
individuals were arrested, detained, tried, convicted, and sentenced to death without
being allowed to exercise their rights under Article 36.84 The ICJ agreed with Mexico
that the U.S. breached its obligations to Mexico under the Vienna Convention.
Specifically, the Court found the following violations of the Convention:

79
Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Government of the United Mexican States (Jan. 9,
2003), Avena (Mex. V. U.S.) (Int’l Ct. Justice), at para. 20 (“Avena application”).
80
Id., para. 22.
81
Id., para. 25.
82
Mexico also sought the assistance of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In an advisory opinion,
the court declared the failure to inform foreign nationals at the time of arrest of the right to consult with a
consular official was a violation of obligations under the Consular Convention and that inmates who had
been convicted and sentenced to death without having been notified of their right to consult their consul
had not been afforded due process of law. See Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the
Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Adv. Op. OC-16/1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser.
A, No. 16 (1999).
83
Id, para. 2. On January 20, 2003, Mexico withdrew its request for provisional measures on behalf of
three of its nationals because their death sentences had been commuted.
84
See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. No. 128
(Judgment of Mar. 31), (hereinafter Avena) para. 12.
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1) the failure to inform, without delay,85 the Mexican nationals of their rights under
the Convention;
2) the failure to inform, without delay, the Mexican consulate of the detention of
their nationals, thereby denying Mexico the opportunity to render assistance to its
nationals;
3) depriving Mexico of its rights to communicate with, and have access to, its
nationals in a timely manner;
4) depriving Mexico of the right to obtain legal representation for its citizens in a
timely fashion;
5) the failure to review and reconsider the convictions and sentences of three
Mexican nationals awaiting execution.86
Mexico sought to have these convictions and sentences overturned and any
statements or other evidence obtained from its nationals prior to receiving consular
notification excluded from any criminal proceedings subsequently brought against
them.87 The court rejected Mexico’s request that their conviction and sentence be
vacated.88 It agreed with the U.S. that there had to be a determination whether the
Vienna Convention violation prejudiced the defendants.89 Most significantly, however, it
agreed with Mexico that the inmates were entitled to a reconsideration of their Vienna
Convention claims. Although it left the choice of means to the United States, the ICJ
rejected the U.S. position that the executive clemency process would provide sufficient
review.90 Furthermore, the court held that U.S. courts should be precluded from applying
the procedural default doctrine to these claims.91
V.

REACTIONS

85

The Court held that without delay doesn’t necessarily mean immediately upon arrest, but it does mean
“as soon as it is realized that the person is a foreign national, or once there are grounds to think that the
person is probably a foreign national.” Id., para. 88.
86
Id., para. 106.
87
Id., para. 13.
88
Id., para. 123.
89
Id., para. 127.
90
Id. para. 143.
91
“In this regard, the Court would point out that what is crucial in the review and reconsideration process is
the existence of a procedure which guarantees that full weight is given to the violation of the rights set forth
in the Vienna Convention, whatever may be the actual outcome of such review and reconsideration.” Id.,
para. 139. The Court also stressed that the clemency process would not provided adequate review. Id.,
para. 143.
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The two top law enforcement officials in Texas reacted negatively to the ICJ’s
decision in Avena. Governor Rick Perry’s spokesman stated, “Obviously the governor
respects the world court’s right to have an opinion, but the fact remains they have no
standing and no jurisdiction in the state of Texas.”92 A spokesman for the Texas
Attorney General proclaimed, “We do not believe the World Court has jurisdiction in
these matters.”93
Most of the reaction outside of Texas has not been nearly as negative. In fact,
there has been a grudging acknowledgement that the decision demands compliance. For
example, in a case involving a Mexican national sentenced to death in Oklahoma without
receiving the consular notification required by the Vienna Convention, the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals held that it was bound by the ICJ’s decision. The court
granted a stay of execution and ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
inmate was prejudiced by the denial of his rights.94 The Governor of Oklahoma
subsequently commuted his sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole as a result of the Avena decision.95 The Arkansas Attorney General dropped its
effort to execute a Mexican national and the Avena decision providing the primary
motivation for doing so.96 Furthermore, California enacted a law requiring obligatory

92

Polly Ross Hughes, U.S. Told To Review Cases of Mexicans Sentenced to Death; Texas Unmoved by
World Court Ruling, Houston Chron., Apr. 1, 2004, at A1 (quoting spokesman Robert Black).
93
Dane Schiller & Maro Robbins, Mexico Wins in World Court, San Antonio Express-News, Apr. 1, 2004,
at 1A.
94
See Torres v. Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004).
95
See Triple Play in Oklahoma: Foreign National Gets Stay, New Hearing And Clemency, May 14, 2004,
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=31&did=579.
96
See ICJ Decision Prompts Settlement in Arkansas Case, August 2004, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=31&did=579.
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advisement of consular rights upon incarceration and the provision of lists of imprisoned
nationals to consulates upon request.97
The most significant reaction was that of the President of the United States.
Recognizing the nation’s obligation to comply with the ICJ’s judgment,98 President
George Bush issued the following directive:
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that the United States
will discharge its international obligations under the decision of the International
Court of Justice . . . by having State courts give effect to the decision in
accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican
nationals addressed in that decision.99
In the next section, I will discuss the legality of the President’s order.
VI.

LEGALITY
The primary objection that Texas is likely to raise is that the President’s order

intrudes upon its sovereignty. Under our federal system, it is an essential attribute of the
States retained sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous within their
proper sphere of authority. As Justice Scalia has correctly stated:
The great innovation of this design was that ‘our citizens would have two political
capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other’
-- a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of
government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of
mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by
it.100

97

See New California Law Enhances Prisoners’ Consular Rights, October 2004, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid&did=579.
98
U.N. Charter art. 94(1). This Article provides:
Each member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International
Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.
99
Quoted in Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent in Medellin v. Dretke,
U.S. Supreme Court Docket no. 04-5928. The brief is available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2004/3mer/1ami/2004-5928.mer.ami.html.
100
Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997).
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The State’s autonomy is greatest when it is defining and enforcing its criminal laws.101
Texas officials will likely argue that the President’s directive, ordering reconsideration of
cases previously reviewed by Texas courts, requires its judges to violate state law and is
therefore an unconstitutional encroachment on Texas’ sovereignty. Furthermore, they
will argue that even if the Avena decision is binding as federal law, the Supreme Court
has resisted federal attempts to conscript state officials into enforcing federal law.102
There is one major flaw in this argument. While it is true that the courts have
held that federal efforts to compel state executive officers to execute federal law is
unconstitutional, the Constitution actually compels state judges to enforce federal
proscriptions, insofar as those proscriptions are related to matters appropriate to judicial
power.103 State judges, for instance, have been required in the past to enforce the fugitive
slave laws, conduct naturalization proceedings, resolve controversies between a captain
and the crew of his ship and enforce laws requiring the deportation of alien enemies in
times of war.104 Thus, there is historical and legal support for President Bush’s order.

101

See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. ____ (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The States’ core police
powers have always included authority to define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare
of their citizens.”).
102
See Printz, supra note 80. (holding that state officials cannot be required to enforce federal law)
103
See Printz supra note 80 at 907:
These early laws establish, at most, that the Constitution was originally understood to permit
imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal prescriptions, insofar as those
prescriptions related to matters appropriate for the judicial power. That assumption was perhaps
implicit in one of the provisions of the Constitution, and was explicit in another. In accord with
the so-called Madisonian Compromise, Article III, § 1, established only a Supreme Court , and
made the creation of lower federal courts optional with the Congress – even though it was obvious
that the Supreme Court alone could not hear all federal cases throughout the United States . . . And
the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, announced that “the Laws of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby.” It is understandable why courts should have been viewed
distinctively in this regard; unlike legislatures and executives, they applied the law of other
sovereigns all the time. The principle underlying so-called “transitory” causes of action was that
laws which operated elsewhere created obligations in justice that courts of the forum state would
enforce.
(emphasis in original)
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Another related objection is likely to be that “by invoking foreign authority to
trump state law, the [President] has explicitly ceded American sovereignty to foreign
institutions that are not accountable to the American people.”105 This argument can be
countered by the fact that the President and the Senate have the constitutional authority to
bind the states to decisions of the ICJ, which they did by ratifying the Vienna Convention
and the Optional Protocol.
President Bush has several additional arguments that he can advance in support of
his actions. The President will cite his constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”106 As a result, he is obligated to enforce the Avena decision since it
is federal law under our constitutional system. In addition, the courts have recognized the
plenary power of the President to conduct foreign affairs.107 Pursuant to this power, the
courts have been willing to allow Presidents to settle disputes with foreign nations as long
as Congress has not taken any action specifically prohibiting the executive from doing so.
For instance, in U.S. v. Belmont,108 the President negotiated an agreement with the Soviet
government to settle the claims of U.S. citizens whose property in Russia had been
nationalized. A lower court held that the part of the agreement requiring a New York
banker to release Soviet assets violated the public policy of the State of New York.109
The Supreme Court held, however, that New York’s public policy had been superseded
by the Presidential agreement:
In respect to all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our
foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the State of
105
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New York does not exist. Within the field of its powers, whatever the United
States rightfully undertakes, it necessarily has warrant to consummate. And when
judicial authority is invoked in aid of such consummation, state constitutions,
state laws, and state policies are irrelevant to the inquiry and decision. It is
inconceivable that any of them can be interposed as an obstacle to the effective
operation of a federal constitutional power.110
In Dames & Moore v. Regan,111 President Carter was allowed to “terminate all
legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United States persons and
institutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachment and judgments
obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to bring about
the termination of such claims through binding arbitration,”112 pursuant to an agreement
with Iran to obtain the release of U.S. hostages being held by Iranian militants with the
support of the Iranian government. After his inauguration, President Reagan reaffirmed
President Carter’s order and suspended all legal claims pending in “any court of the
United States.”113 Dames & Moore had previously sued Iran to recover money owed to
its subsidiary under a service contract and brought an action challenging the validity of
the Presidential authority to suspend claims pending in U.S. courts.114 The President’s
action was upheld because “the settlement of claims has been determined to be a
necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our country
and another, and where, as here, we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in the
President’s action, we are not prepared to say that the President lacks the power to settle
such claims.”115
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In light of the fact that Congress seems to have acquiesced in the
President’s action by adopting the Optional Protocol, the fact that state courts are
obligated to enforce federal law and the deference that courts have traditionally given
Presidents in conducting foreign relations, the President’s directive ordering the state
courts in Texas and elsewhere to review the inmates’ convictions appears to be lawful
and therefore must be complied with and trumps any state laws which may conflict with
the order.
VII. COURT PROCEEDINGS
A. State Court
The 51 Mexican nationals who were the subject of the Avena litigation are at
different stages of their appellate proceedings. Some are currently in direct appeal; others
are seeking either state or federal habeas relief.116 At least 3 had exhausted their appeals
when the Avena decision was handed down.117 Normally, those on direct appeal can
raise the Vienna Convention claim in their state habeas proceedings as long as they
objected either at pre-trial or at trial. Those who were in state habeas can probably
amend their petitions to include the Vienna Convention claim, again, as long as they
objected earlier. Those inmates, like Jose Medellin, who have exhausted their state
habeas proceedings are precluded from having new claims considered in most
instances.118 The President’s order, however, directs the state courts in Texas to consider
each inmate’s Vienna Convention claim irrespective of state law.
It is not clear how Texas and other state courts will respond to the President’s
order. They could (1) accept that the ICJ’s judgment and the President’s directive legally
116
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obligate them to consider each inmate’s Vienna Convention claim anew; (2) reject the
President’s directive and decline to consider the claims of those inmates who have
exhausted the state habeas process on the grounds suggested by state officials that neither
the ICJ’s judgment nor the President’s directive is binding on a state court; (3) consider
the claims as a matter of comity but dismiss the inmates’ claims on procedural grounds,
for instance, that the convention does not confer individual rights or that the claim was
procedurally defaulted by those inmates who failed to object earlier; (4) accept the ICJ’s
judgment as a matter of comity and accept the ICJ’s conclusion that the convention
confers individual rights and that the convention precludes the procedural default
doctrine from being invoked to deny consideration of the merits of the inmates’ claims.
The Texas courts should consider the cases on the merits in light of the
President’s order. Once they accept the cases, the courts will have to decide how to
resolve the cases. They may take the same position that the Convention does not confer
individual rights. By ordering the Texas courts of consider the inmates’ claims, the
President has obviously taken the opposite position and under the Supremacy clause, his
position must prevail. The ICJ also indicated that the procedural default doctrine should
not preclude relief and this position should also prevail as a result of the President’s
order. The ICJ did, however, indicated that the inmates would have to prove that they
were prejudiced by the violation of their rights under the Convention in order to prevail.
Thus, the Texas courts must determine whether the inmates suffered any prejudice.
The Texas courts should find that any inmate who was offered and rejected a life
sentence was prejudiced by the failure to receive consular notification. Angel Francisco
Breard’s case is a perfect illustration why such inmates were harmed by not having
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consular assistance. Breard did not fully understand the differences between the US and
Paraguayan systems.119 He was under the impression that a plea bargain would be
rejected as they are in Paraguay and that the wiser course of action would be to confess
and plead for mercy before the jury because confessions are the preferred course of action
in Paraguay.120 Had the Paraguayan consulate been notified in a timely manner, they
would have explained to him the differences between the two legal systems and would
have advised him to accept the offer.121 Any inmate who rejected a plea offer from state
officials would have been adversely affected by the failure to discuss such an offer with
is consulate officials and should be entitled to relief.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that it is essential that capital defendants be
allowed to present mitigating evidence.122 The bulk of a foreign national’s mitigating
evidence would be in his home country. The Mexican consulate would have been able to
assist trial counsel in securing mitigating evidence in Mexico. Therefore, an inmate who
secured mitigating evidence after he was sentenced to death with the assistance of the
Mexican government should be entitled to relief.
Finally, the courts should treat a confession obtained in violation of the Vienna
Convention the same as it would a confession obtained in violation of Miranda.123 The
rationale for excluding confessions without providing Miranda warnings is that the
interrogation process is often so intimidating to a suspect that the confession may not be
reliable.124 A confession which is obtained from a foreign national, who is often
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unfamiliar with the American legal system is also unreliable. Therefore, any inmate from
whom a confession was extracted without providing consular access should have his
conviction and sentence reevaluated in the same manner that a Miranda-defective
confession would be. Thus, if the admission of the confession harmed the defendant, he
should be entitled to a new trial.
Because Texas courts are notorious for not granting relief to death row inmates, it
is likely that most, if not all, of these cases will end up in federal court.
B. Federal Court
Once the inmates’ Vienna Convention claim has been considered by the state
courts, they are allowed to seek relief in federal court. Their federal court proceedings
will be governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).125
The AEDPA controls the process by which a state prisoner may obtain federal
habeas relief. This statute was enacted in 1996 for the purpose of streamlining death
penalty and other inmate appeals. Those inmates who are not successful in state court in
obtaining relief will have to overcome AEDPA’s many hurdles in order to obtain relief in
federal court.
The first issue the federal courts will have to resolve is whether the AEDPA is
even applicable in these cases in light of the President’s order. In Avena, the court held
that the inmates’ Vienna Convention claim had to receive a review and reconsideration
“which guarantees that full weight is given to the violation of the rights set forth in the
Vienna Convention.”126 An argument can be made that, given this holding, the AEDPA
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is not applicable since it would not permit full review and reconsideration of the inmates’
claim.
As discussed earlier, federal statutes and treaties are both the supreme law of the
land and are on equal footing in our constitutional system. In the event of a conflict
between the two, the courts have long applied the rule that the one last in date will control
the other.127 Since the AEDPA was enacted well after the Convention was ratified, the
Supreme Court has held that the AEDPA should take precedence in these cases.128 The
“latest in time” rule has usually been applied, however, where it is clear that Congress
intended to overrule the previous enactment. In this case, there is no evidence that
Congress even considered and certainly never intended by the enactment of the AEDPA
to override the nation’s obligations under the Vienna Convention.129 Nevertheless, the
federal courts are likely to continue to hold that the AEDPA takes precedence over the
Convention and apply it in assessing the inmates’ claim.130
Each inmate will have to overcome the provision of the AEDPA that requires that
tremendous deference be given to both the factual and legal determinations of state
courts. A state court’s factual determinations can be overcome by clear and convincing
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evidence to the contrary.131 A state court’s legal conclusions can be overturned only if
unreasonable or contrary to clearly established federal law.132 A decision that conflicts
with federal law is not entitled to deference. Should the state courts take the position
some state courts have taken,133 that the Convention does not confer individual rights,
such a decision would be contrary to the President’s order and not entitled to any
deference. If the state courts determine that the inmates were not prejudiced by the
failure to receive notification, they would have the difficult task of proving not only that
the decision was incorrect but also unreasonable.134
As a result of the AEDPA, it is going to be a challenge for the Mexican inmates to
obtain federal habeas relief in the event that their claims are denied by the state courts.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The United States has several interests at stake in these cases. First, and most
obviously, every nation, especially the U.S., has an interest in nations complying with
international law. More specifically, given the frequency with which Americans travel
abroad, full compliance with the Vienna Convention is in the U.S. interest.135 Second, as
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the most frequent litigator before the ICJ,136 high level and uniform compliance with ICJ
decisions is essential and this case provides the U.S. with an opportunity to stress the
importance of compliance.137 Finally, the United States has an interest in a strong
relationship with Mexico.138 The two nations share a border, there is a strong economic
relationship between the two nations, as evidenced by the North American Free Trade
Agreement, and Mexico’s cooperation is essential to U.S. efforts to fight terrorism,
curtail illegal immigration and combat drug trafficking. Therefore, the failure to fully
comply with the Avena decision could severely damage U.S.-Mexican relations.
President Bush responded appropriately to the Avena decision. This article has
demonstrated that he had the authority to issue the directive that he issued. Given the
importance of this case to the U.S. and Mexico, should the state courts refuse to comply
with his order, he should seek to force their compliance. Compliance, however, does not
mean that the inmates’ long journey through the U.S. and international court systems will
ultimately be successful.
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